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ABSTRACT 
Conservation easements (CE) are widely recognized as a double-
edged sword. On one hand, CEs are praised because they protect, 
usually in perpetuity, millions of acres of non-federal land from 
development. However, CE policy is slated to undergo wide reform due 
to abuse of the generous tax benefits that are awarded to landowners 
who donate CEs. The Treasury Department has proposed specific 
changes to the portion of the Internal Revenue Code that governs CEs, 
yet there is little widespread consensus for proper reform measures. 
This Article theorizes that, unlike the vast majority of CEs managed 
by state and local land trusts for general conservation purposes, CEs 
administered to protect specific resources are far less often the object 
of abuse or litigation. For example, the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) administers CE programs specifically designed to 
conserve agricultural land and forestland. Additionally, some 
conservation organizations implement CEs dedicated to that 
organization’s narrow focus on the preservation of certain flora, 
fauna, or ecosystems. This article argues resource-based 
specialization sparks more extensive front-end planning and builds 
greater institutional knowledge, which are keys to minimizing CE 
abuse and ensuring successful CE use over the long term. Thus, a 
resource-based approach should be incorporated into successful CE 
reform to avoid losing the CE as a vital conservation tool. 
INTRODUCTION 
Conservation easements (CE) are an invaluable land conservation 
tool, but extensive and increasing litigation concerning the federal 
charitable income tax deduction available to landowners who donate 
CEs as charitable gifts indicates the need for their reform. These 
seemingly simple contract-like agreements between a volunteering 
landowner and a qualified conservation organization or government 
entity have revealed their complexity in recent years, and their 
governing principles need to adjust accordingly. New CE tax policy 
should account for the diverse nature of resources protected by CEs to 
ensure successful land preservation while minimizing litigation and 
abuse of tax deductions. 
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Tax-deductible CEs are used to protect a wide variety of resources: 
farms, golf courses, historical building facades, forests, ranches, and 
recreational properties, just to name a few. Unlike many other federal 
resource protection tools, which are written with a specific resource in 
mind, the only directly applicable federal law governing tax-deductible 
CEs is Internal Revenue Code § 170(h), which authorizes deductions 
more generally—for the donation of a wide variety of CEs.1 
In contrast, resource-specific management statutes dominate 
progressive federal environmental and natural resources law. For 
example, the National Forest Management Act seeks to govern the 
sustainable management of federally held forest resources, the Clean 
Water Act controls use or abuse of water resources, the Clean Air Act 
does the same for air, and so on. This specialization in environmental 
regulation suggests different resources are most effectively controlled, 
regulated, and protected in different ways. The Clean Air Act’s rules 
about hazardous air pollutants differ from its rules concerning air 
pollutants that are not hazardous to human health and from the Clean 
Water Act’s rules about water pollution or use. It is unrealistic to expect 
successful management of both air and water resources from a single 
set of rules. It likewise is unrealistic to expect successful governance 
of historical building facades, to use a relevant example, using the same 
set of rules that govern wildlife refuges. Nevertheless, on a national 
level, the federal tax incentive program for CE donations relies on a tax 
code section that applies the same rules to CEs protecting a broad array 
of resources. 
Resource-specific legal tailoring is widely accepted and used within 
environmental regulation and should be applied to CE reform. 
Specialization and national uniformity is a practice evolved with 
society to ensure successful environmental protection, and tax-
deductible CEs should be no exception. Careful reform will ensure 
these CEs maintain their vital place in the conservation landscape while 
minimizing abuse. 
 
1 I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A) (2015) (“[T]he preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation 
by, or the education of, the general public, the protection of . . . relatively natural habitat[s] 
of fish, wildlife, or plants, or similar ecosystem[s], the preservation of open space (including 
farmland and forest land) . . . for the scenic enjoyment of the general public, or pursuant to 
a clearly delineated . . . governmental conservation policy, [and in either case such open-
space preservation must yield significant public benefit], or the preservation of an 
historically important land area or a certified historic structure.”). 
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This Article lays out a conceptual framework for building a 
resource-specific element into the federal tax incentive program for 
CEs. The first section briefly outlines the relevant background and legal 
principles concerning how § 170(h) generally functions today. The 
second section gives an overview of the challenges that have arisen 
with the federal tax incentive program. The third section discusses two 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs that use resource-
specific CEs as a tool to protect non-federal land. The fourth section 
looks at the CE acquisition methodology of charitable conservation 
organizations that have tailored their mission according to specific 
resources they seek to protect. The final section identifies the strengths 
of these CE implementation methods that can be used as guidelines to 
create resource-specific CE rules for the federal tax incentive program. 
I 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
Put simply, a CE is an agreement between a landowner and a 
qualified conservation organization or government body that restricts 
future activities on the subject land to protect the land’s conservation 
value.2 In practice, this agreement functions more or less like a contract 
with the deed acting to bind the parties.3 The landowner retains 
ownership of the land, but gives certain rights to restrict the use of the 
property, generally those that might impede conservation, to the 
easement holder.4 However, unlike a typical contract, the public is the 
beneficiary of a CE, and the public subsidizes the acquisition of CEs 
through tax incentive and easement purchase programs. Accordingly, 
a variety of other federal and state laws that protect the public interest, 
like those governing charitable organizations or charitable donations, 
also apply to CEs.5 In addition, what CEs protect, how they protect it, 
and the sheer number of CEs are quickly increasing and adding to the 
complexity of this seemingly straightforward arrangement. 
The most significant federal tax incentive offered to landowners who 
donate CEs is the charitable income tax deduction under § 170(h),6 
 
2 ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT 
HANDBOOK 7 (2d ed. 2005). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Federico Cheever & Nancy A. McLaughlin, An Introduction to Conservation 
Easements in the United States: A Simple Concept and a Complicated Mosaic of Law, 1 J. 
L. PROP. & SOC’Y 107, 134-35 (2015).  
6 Id. at 119. 
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which authorizes a deduction for the donation of a wide variety of CEs.7 
Typically, taxpayers are not eligible for tax benefits for donating only 
partial property interests, but the Internal Revenue Code makes an 
exception for “qualified conservation contributions.”8 Under § 170(h), 
a landowner who donates a CE can claim a charitable income tax 
deduction provided the CE is “granted in perpetuity,”9 to a “qualified 
organization,”10 exclusively for one or more of four specified 
conservation purposes,11 and the conservation purpose is “protected in 
perpetuity.”12 A landowner may also claim a deduction for the donation 
component of a part sale or part gift (also called a “bargain sale”) of a 
CE.13 The value of the CE for purposes of the deduction is generally 
equal to the difference between the fair market value of the land not 
encumbered by the easement and the fair market value of the land once 
it has been encumbered.14 Many states offer additional state tax benefits 
for CE donations.15 
The Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA) is a model 
conservation easement enabling statute that has been adopted in some 
form by almost half of the states.16 The UCEA principally encourages 
states to enact provisions that override traditional common law 
impediments to the long-term validity of CEs, which are often held in 
gross, “meaning they benefit one or more individuals who do not own 
land adjacent to the easement.”17 However, state enabling statutes vary 
because they do not have to follow the UCEA verbatim or meet any 
national criteria. Further, states can enact laws that make it impossible 
 
7 Id. at 119−20. 
8 I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(A), (B)(iii) (2005). 
9 Id. § 170(h)(1)(A), (2)(C). 
10 Id. § 170(h)(1)(B), (3). 
11 Id. § 170(h)(1)(C), (4). 
12 Id. § 170(h)(5). 
13 See, e.g., Browning v. Comm’r, 109 T.C. 303, 325 (1997) (holding that Plaintiffs’ were 
entitled to claim a charitable contribution for the bargain sale of an easement to the county 
government). 
14 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i) (2009). 
15 BYERS & PONTE, supra note 2, at 11–12. 
16 Uniform Law Comm’n, Legislative Fact Sheet- Conservation Easement Act, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Conservation%20Easement
%20Act (last visited Dec. 15, 2016); see also Dana Joel Gattuso, Conservation Easements: 
The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly, NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y RESEARCH (May 2008), 
http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA569.html (describing the UCEA generally). 
17 Id. 
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to comply with portions of § 170(h). For example, in Wachter v. 
Commissioner, the Tax Court held the donation of the CEs in question, 
which were governed by North Dakota law, did not qualify for a 
deduction under § 170(h) because they were not “granted in 
perpetuity.”18 Under North Dakota law, any easement created in the 
state has a maximum duration of ninety-nine years, regardless of the 
terms of the deed.19 
The UCEA also specifies conservation purposes of a CE, limits the 
organizations that can hold a CE, and provides provisions for 
authorizing third-party enforcement of CEs.20 However, the UCEA 
does not offer guidance regarding how to craft resource-specific CEs 
or how to value the economic and conservation values of CEs 
depending on the resource in question. Thus, the UCEA attempts to 
achieve uniformity within the CE system and related applicability of 
the tax benefit and to provide states, localities, and land trusts with 
guidance on CE implementation but fails for the same reasons as             
§ 170(h). Like § 170(h), the UCEA does not offer guidance on different 
types of CEs that are implemented with different resources in mind or 
create a true national implementation system. Thus, the UCEA mirrors 
the issues of § 170(h) in that, though it provides guidance on how to 
coordinate with federal law, it does not actually implement a national 
law and does not offer guidance on how to specialize CEs with respect 
to specific resources. 
Some of the most common CEs are open space easements, 
agricultural easements, facade easements, forest easements, wetland 
easements, habitat easements, and grassland easements, but the list 
goes on. This diversity makes reform extremely difficult to fully 
address. Consequently, this Article simply provides a conceptual 
framework without fully considering every potential resource-specific 
nuance of the federal tax incentive program. For example, this Article 
will not specifically address facade easements, although the principles 
developed promoting resource-specific management could be readily 
applied in that context, as historic facades are equally if not more 
distinct than variable natural resource conservation values. 
This Article is also limited to providing conceptual guidance on 
reforms relating to the acquisition of resource-specific CEs (“front-
end” reforms) and does not make comprehensive policy 
 
18 142 T.C. 140, 149 (2014). 
19 Id. at 146. 
20 Gattuso, supra note 16. 
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recommendations. Specifically, this Article does not address the 
equally important task of implementing reforms to ensure the proper 
enforcement, administration, and interpretation of perpetual CEs over 
the long term on behalf of the public (“back-end” reforms). 
II 
MAJOR FRONT-END ABUSES OF THE § 170(h) DEDUCTION 
On some level, § 170(h) is to blame for the vast majority of abuse21 
concerning CEs. Its generosity is almost certainly the reason for the 
widespread use of CEs as a voluntary conservation tool. But for this 
generosity, potential CE donors would have far less incentive to abuse 
the tax system. As evidenced by the litigation in this context, two major 
forms of abuse of the § 170(h) deduction are the donation of CEs that 
are either overvalued or do not satisfy the conservation purposes tests 
specified in § 170(h). The discussion below is only a brief overview of 
these issues. Though it does not depict the entire scope of the problem, 
this discussion should help illustrate how CE specialization could 
address common § 170(h) pitfalls. 
Proponents of CEs often cite their voluntary, localized nature as a 
positive. However, these positive qualities make application of a broad 
federal statute like § 170(h) difficult and susceptible to abuse because 
local controls are not uniform or resource specific. Additionally, there 
is minimal front-end control or involvement by the federal government 
when CEs are donated, which allows issues to rise to the surface, 
usually in some type of audit process, only after the easement is already 
in effect and the tax deduction has been claimed. 
A. Valuation Abuses 
To be eligible for a deduction under § 170(h) for the donation of a 
CE, the owner of the property must obtain a qualified appraisal of the 
CE.22 The Treasury Regulations interpreting § 170(h) provide the 
 
21 The term “abuse” refers to CE users cashing in on huge tax benefits without providing 
the intended conservation benefit or any burden on their land by either overvaluing or under-
protecting the land at issue. The abuses are commonly recognized by the IRS and by legal 
and tax professionals. E.g., Joe Stephens, IRS Starts Team on Easement Abuses, WASH. 
POST (June 9, 2005), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/06/09/irs          
-starts-team-on-easement-abuses/bce00d7f-5d12-40be-86c4-9876b58c85a7/?utm_term=.c 
bd7d3801def. 
22 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(B)(iii)(I). 
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amount of the deduction depends on the CE’s fair market value at the 
time it is donated.23 According to the Treasury Regulations, the ideal 
way to determine the fair market value of an easement would be to use 
sales of comparable easements.24 However, comparable CE sales are 
generally unavailable because CEs are generally not bought and sold in 
open markets,25 and their terms and the properties they encumber are 
generally different (they are not “comparable”).26 Accordingly, 
appraisers are generally forced to use the Treasury Regulation’s backup 
method to determine value—the before and after method: “[T]he fair 
market value of a perpetual conservation restriction is equal to the 
difference between the fair market value of the property it encumbers 
before the granting of the restriction and the fair market value of the 
encumbered property after the granting of the restriction.”27 
Because of the indirect way CEs are valued, the various valuation 
methods that may be employed, the fact that there generally will be a 
range of plausible before and after values for the subject properties, and 
the fact that appraisers are employed by the taxpayers, appraisers often 
assert high values for conservation easements. As a result, the IRS often 
disputes these asserted values and prepares or obtains its own 
appraisals, and rightfully so considering the size of the deductions that 
are claimed. For example, in Palmer Ranch Holdings v. Commissioner, 
the taxpayer originally claimed a $23.9 million deduction for the 
donation of a CE on just over eighty-two acres in Sarasota County, 
Florida (a deduction of $291,000 per acre).28 Large numbers like those 
in Palmer Ranch are not uncommon, equating to large losses in federal 
tax revenue.29 
 
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i) (2009). 
24 Id. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii) (2009). 
25 See Browning v. C.I.R., 109 T.C. 303, 325 (1997) (holding that Plaintiffs could 
introduce evidence of fair market value before and after CE donation where CEs sold as part 
of a county’s bargain sale program did not provide accurate valuation). 
26 See, e.g., Trout Ranch, LLC v. C.I.R., 493 F. App’x 944, 955 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(affirming tax court valuation where comparables were “scarce” or were bargain sales). 
27 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i) (2009). 
28 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1408 (2014) (The court eventually allowed the taxpayer to claim a 
$19.9 million deduction, but the case is now on appeal.). 
29 See, e.g., Kiva Dunes Conservation L.L.C. v. C.I.R., 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818 (2009) 
(sustaining a $28.6 million deduction for the donation of a CE on a 140-acre golf course); 
Herman v. C.I.R., 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 197 (2009) (disallowing a $21.8 million deduction 
claimed with regard to a facade easement restricting use of some of the development rights 
above a historic building on Fifth Avenue in New York City); Seventeen Seventy Sherman 
St., LLC v. C.I.R., 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1599 (2014) (disallowing a $7.2 million claimed 
deduction for the donation of interior and exterior easements on a shrine in downtown 
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B. Conservation Purpose Abuses 
As noted earlier, tax-deductible conservation easements can be 
donated for a wide variety of broadly stated conservation purposes. 
Further, the regulations impose only general limitations on the 
retention of development and use rights that could have negative 
implications for the conservation purposes of a tax-deductible CE.30 
Subsequent litigation shows that this vague guidance lends itself to 
interpretation disputes. 
For example, in Turner v. Commissioner and Herman v. 
Commissioner, the courts found that limitations on development in the 
taxpayers’ CEs were not enough to support conservation purposes 
under § 170(h).31 In Turner, the taxpayer donated a conservation 
easement that purported to reduce the number of residential lots on a 
29.3-acre parcel located near President Washington’s Mount Vernon 
estate from sixty-two to thirty lots.32 However, approximately half the 
property was in a one hundred-year floodplain, a constraint that itself 
limited development to only thirty lots under existing zoning laws.33 In 
finding that the conservation easement did nothing to protect open 
space or the historic character of the area, the Tax Court explained that 
the taxpayer “simply developed the . . . property to its maximum yield 
within the property’s zoning classification.”34 
In Herman, the Tax Court disallowed a $21.8 million deduction 
claimed with regard to a facade easement that purported to restrict the 
use of a portion of the development rights above a historic structure on 
 
Denver); Belk v. C.I.R., 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 2014) (affirming the Tax Court’s 
disallowance of a $10.5 million deduction claimed with regard to a conservation easement 
encumbering a 184-acre golf course); Mountanos v. C.I.R., 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1211 (2014) 
(disallowing a $4.7 million deduction claimed with regard to remote rugged undeveloped 
land in Lake County, California). 
30 See Treas. Reg. § 1.17A-14(d)(4)(v) (prohibiting deductions for easements that would 
permit a degree of development that would interfere with scenic qualities or governmental 
purpose of the easement); id. § 1.17A-14(e)(2)–(3) (prohibiting deductions for CEs that 
would allow for the destruction of an important resource unless destruction of one resource 
is necessary to protect the resource the CE is intended to protect); id. § 1.17A-14(g)(1) 
(requiring that uses of the subject land be consistent with the conservation purposes of the 
land). 
31 Turner v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 299 (2006); Herman v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 197 
(2009). 
32 Turner, 126 T.C. at 301. 
33 Id. at 313. 
34 Id. at 317. 
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Fifth Avenue in New York City.35 The court found that the 
conservation easement did not prevent demolition of the historic 
structure and that limiting the right to develop a portion of the airspace 
above the building did not preserve either the structure or a historically 
important land area.36 Accordingly, the court found the facade 
easement did not satisfy the historic preservation conservation purpose 
test.37 
On the other hand, in Glass v. Commissioner, the Sixth Circuit 
rejected the IRS’s argument that the habitat protection conservation 
purposes test was not met because the grantors retained too many use 
rights in their easements.38 Glass involved two conservation easements 
that encumbered only a small portion of a ten-acre parcel on the shore 
of Lake Michigan.39 The Sixth Circuit rejected the IRS’s argument, 
despite the small size of the property and the grantors’ retention of 
rights to recreate and build accommodating facilities like a boathouse 
and footpath on the property.40 The court found that potential high-
quality habitat for endangered eagles would continue to exist even 
when landowners exercised those rights.41 Thus, the CE was sufficient 
to support the conservation purposes test.42 
The IRS made a similar argument regarding reserved rights in 
Butler, which involved conservation easements encumbering land in 
Georgia.43 The grantors in Butler reserved significant development and 
use rights in the easements, including residential subdivision, 
agricultural, commercial timbering, and recreational rights.44 However, 
the grantors introduced evidence at trial in the form of testimony from 
environmental consultants that the habitat on the property would 
continue to be protected even at full exercise of all reserved rights, and 
the IRS failed to introduce any evidence to the contrary.45 The Tax 
Court held for the grantors, finding that, although the evidence on the 
 
35 Herman, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 197, *1 (2006). 
36 Id. at *9. 
37 Id. at *11. 
38 471 F.3d 698, 708 (6th Cir. 2006). 
39 Id. at 700. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 709. 
42 Id. 
43 Butler v. C.I.R., 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1359, *4 (2012). 
44 Id. at *13. 
45 Id. at *9. 
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issue was “sparse,” the habitat would continue to be protected even at 
full exercise of all the reserved rights.46 
Golf courses are also a contentious topic in this context, and the 
Treasury Department (Treasury) has proposed eliminating the 
deduction for conservation easements on golf courses.47 The Treasury 
argues golf courses provide benefit only to select individuals who have 
the opportunity to use or live near the course, are particularly 
susceptible to overvaluation, and may result in environmental 
degradation.48 On the other hand, golf course advocates point out that 
golf courses provide over two million acres of green space nationally 
that can be managed sustainably to provide habitat, forests, water or 
other environmental assets.49 
The above cases illustrate the difficulty in determining whether a CE 
satisfies the conservation purposes test under § 170(h). Without more 
guidance or specificity as to what constitutes “conservation purposes,” 
the abuse and debate surrounding CE tax benefits will almost certainly 
continue. 
III 
USDA CONSERVATION PROGRAMS 
The Natural Resources and Environment “Mission Area” of the 
USDA is charged with ensuring the “health of the land through 
sustainable management.”50 That Mission Area’s two agencies, the 
U.S. Forest Service (USFS) and the Natural Resources Conservation 
Service (NRCS), work to “prevent damage to natural resources and the 
environment, restore the resource base, and promote good 
management.”51 NRCS acts primarily as a technical and financial 
facilitator of land conservation, while the USFS acts as both a direct 
land manager of National Forests and a technical assistant to forestland 
 
46 Id. at *35. 
47 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS 189 (2015). 
48 Id. 
49 Prepare Golf for the Future, WE ARE GOLF, http://wearegolf.org/sustainability/value/ 
(last visited June 26, 2015). 
50 USDA Mission Areas: Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 
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owners in a lesser capacity.52 However, both agencies foster 
conservation of working resource systems intended to provide 
ecosystem services, rather than the pure preservation that other federal 
agencies, such as the National Park Service, strive for. Thus, the 
underlying philosophy of these two agencies is generally to manage 
resources for long-term sustainable use beyond their inherent scenic, 
conservation, recreational, or historic qualities. Because CEs can be 
used to manage sustainable resources as well as protect conservation 
values, it follows that both agencies rely on CEs as a tool for land 
conservation.53 Thus, these agencies contribute to the increasing use of 
CEs nationally.54 
Every four years, Congress passes legislation governing the 
activities of the USDA that is known as the Farm Bill.55 According to 
the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, the 
Farm Bill is “the single most important piece of legislation for 
improving the quality of life and economic vitality of our rural 
communities.”56 The 2008 Farm Bill included eight conservation 
programs intended to encourage new conservation and provide more 
funding for technical assistance.57 It also focused on cooperative 
conservation programs by allocating six percent of all program funds 
to carry out cooperative projects that bring together “producers, states, 
nonprofit organizations and other groups.”58 The last and most 
significant of the 2008 Farm Bill’s conservation initiatives was its 
limitation of participation in the USDA conservation programs to 
individuals whose gross adjusted incomes do not exceed $1 million 
annually, unless that income is derived from farming, ranching, or 
forestry.59 
 
52 See generally About: Regulations and Policies, U.S. FOREST SERV., http://www.fs.fed 
.us/about-agency/regulations-policies (last visited Nov. 21, 2016). 
53 USDA Mission Areas: Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 
(Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&con 
tentid=missionarea_NRE.xml. 
54 See generally About: Regulations and Policies, U.S. FOREST SERV., http://www.fs.fed 
.us/about-agency/regulations-policies (last visited Nov. 21, 2016). 
55 Farm Bill: Investments for the future, U.S. COMM. ON AGRIC., NUTRITION, AND 
FORESTRY 1 (2008), http://www.agriculture.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2008_farm_bill 
_highlights.pdf. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 2−4. 
58 Id. at 2. 
59 Id. at 3. 
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The 2012 Farm Bill purported to implement the “most significant 
reforms in agricultural policy in decades” and claimed it would reduce 
the national deficit by $23 billion by ending direct payments to farmers 
and streamlining and consolidating programs.60 Taken together, the 
2008 and 2012 Farm Bills drastically changed the USDA’s operations 
and policy and, in turn, dramatically increased their use of CEs as a 
conservation tool. It is also important to note the fiscal measures of the 
2012 Farm Bill because, as shown below, the need to decrease the 
budget naturally resulted in prioritization of resources. The following 
parts detail the changes from the 2008 to 2012 Farm Bill with respect 
to CE implementation. 
A. USFS & CEs 
In addition to its direct management of federally held national 
forests, the USFS encourages healthy management of state and 
privately held forestlands. Because more than fifty-seven percent of all 
forestland in the United States is privately owned, and it is being 
converted for development at an alarming rate—over 10.3 million acres 
from 1982 to 1997—the federal government has a strong interest in 
promoting preservation on private lands.61 This is an issue not only 
because of direct loss of forestlands, but also because isolation of forest 
fragments can change or lessen the ability of private, state, and national 
forests to provide their full ecological, economic, and social benefits.62 
Over the years, Congress has offered fairly direct production- and 
finance-centric incentives for forest sustainability and management, 
such as reforestation tax benefits or timber production exclusions from 
income taxation.63 Incentives to acquire CEs are a valuable addition to 
these tax incentives because CEs can be used for less production-
 
60 Agriculture Reform, Food and Jobs Act of 2012, U.S. S. COMM. ON AGRIC., 
NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, http://www.ag.senate.gov/issues/agriculture-reform-food-and 
-jobs-act-of-2012. 
61 STATE FOREST SERV. TEAM ET AL., USDA Forest Service Forest Legacy Program: 5-
Year Strategic Direction, App. A (2005), http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/coop/library/flp 
_strategicdir.pdf [hereinafter FLP Strategic Direction]. (Strategic Direction, authored in 
2005, is the most recent update currently on the USFS website concerning the conceptual 
goals of the FLP.). 
62 Id. at 3. 
63 John M. Vandlik, Waiting for Uncle Sam to Buy the Farm . . . Forest, or Wetland? A 
Call for New Emphasis on State and Local Land Use Controls in Natural Resource 
Protection, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 691, 697−98 (1997). 
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centric purposes. Unlike the forest-specific tax incentives, which focus 
on expenditures for the implementation of timber production, CEs can 
be used to conserve forest ecosystem services other than timber 
production, such as water, wildlife, fire preparedness, or erosion 
control.64 
The Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act (CFAA), enacted in 1978, 
recognizes the importance of protecting privately owned forestlands 
because most of the nation’s forestlands are in private ownership and 
subject increasing development and population pressures.65 The CFAA 
emphasizes the importance of protecting working forests to provide not 
only forest commodities, but also ecosystem services, like fish and 
wildlife habitat, watershed function and water supply, aesthetic 
qualities, historical and cultural resources, and recreational 
opportunities.66 The CFAA started the momentum of federal 
involvement, beyond reforestation credits, in state and private 
forestland holdings. Because this momentum was started with the idea 
of protecting ecosystems, rather than just timber reserves, federal 
protection of state and private forest resources has been a more 
intentional, well-planned process, as evidenced by the evolution of its 
Cooperative Forestry programs shown below. 
Today, in the most recent offshoot of the CFAA, the USFS 
implements “Cooperative Forestry” programs to encourage healthy 
forest management on non-federal forestlands by working with states 
and private land owners to improve forest health.67 Four national 
programs exist under the Cooperative Forestry umbrella: “Forest 
Stewardship,” “Forest Legacy,” “Community Forest,” and “Urban and 
Community Forestry.”68 
New policies in the 2008 Farm Bill prompted the USFS to redesign 
its Cooperative Forestry programs.69 The purpose of the redesign was 
to address “the greatest threats to forest sustainability and accomplish 
meaningful change in high priority areas.”70 The USFS has stated that 
 
64 Id. 
65 U.S.D.A. FOREST SERV., FOREST LEGACY PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES, 
2 (2003), http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/coop/library/fpl_guidelines.pdf. 
66 Id. 
67 Cooperative Forestry, U.S. FOREST SERV. (July 15, 2014), http://www.fs.fed.us/spf 
/coop/. 
68 Id. 
69 State and Private Forestry Redesign, U.S. FOREST SERV. (last updated Mar. 10, 2016, 
3:41 PM), http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/redesign/ [hereinafter Redesign]. 
70 Id. 
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this new approach applies “progressive competitive strategies” to a 
portion of the federal funds devoted to state and private forest 
protection projects.71 To aid in this prioritization process, the USFS 
required each state to complete a state-wide “Assessment and Strategy 
for Forest Resources,” which analyzes forest conditions and trends in 
the state and delineates priority rural and urban forest landscape areas. 
The idea behind these assessments is to provide long-term plans for the 
investment of federal, state, and other resources where they will be 
most effective.72 
The USFS’s motivation behind the redesign is that the nation’s 
forests are experiencing new and significant health challenges, such as 
rising tree mortality due to disease and invasive pests, increased 
wildfire size and intensity, climate change disturbances, and 
conversion to non-forest uses.73 The agency’s focus on prioritization 
suggests that budget increases are not following the increased threats 
at a comparable rate. Because CEs are a relatively cheap way to manage 
large tracts of land, it makes sense that the USFS is incorporating them 
as a major tool to help meet the redesign’s purpose: to “shape and 
influence forestland use on a scale, and in a way, that optimizes public 
health benefits from trees and forests for both current and future 
generations.”74 
1. The Forest Legacy Program 
The USFS Cooperative Forestry Program charged with CE 
implementation is the Forest Legacy Program (FLP).75 The 2012 Farm 
Bill extended the FLP through 2017 and set a new authorized level of 
funding for the program at $200 million per year.76 As it does with all 
Cooperative Forestry programs, the USFS partners with states to 




73 Id. (The USFS redesign webpage states that forests are being permanently converted 
to non-forest uses at a rate of one million acres per year.). 
74 Id. 
75 Forest Legacy Program, U.S. FOREST SERV. (last updated Dec. 16, 2013, 2:19 PM), 
http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/coop/programs/loa/aboutflp.shtml [hereinafter Forest Legacy 
Program]. 
76 U.S. S. COMM. ON AGRIC., NUTRITION, & FORESTRY, 112TH CONG., AGRICULTURAL 
REFORM, FOOD, AND JOBS ACT OF 2012: SECTION BY SECTION SUMMARY 44 (Comm. Print 
2012). 
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environmentally sensitive forestlands that are threatened by 
development or other non-forest uses.77 The broad goals of the FLP are 
to promote forestland protection, conservation opportunities, and 
ecological values such as “important scenic, cultural, wildlife, 
recreational, and riparian resources.”78 Land that falls within these 
goals is protected either with a CE or by fee-simple purchase.79 
However, unlike § 170(h), the FLP continues to narrow and specify as 
eligibility is further limited to states that prepare an “Assessment of 
Need” that shows, at a minimum, that there are environmentally 
important areas threatened by conversion to non-forest uses in the 
state.80 
The FLP laid out the program’s priorities in 2005 in its “5-Year 
Strategic Direction” (“Strategic Direction”), which outlines strategies 
for achieving the broad goals of the FLP, namely to improve 
accountability and performance of the program on a uniform national 
level with the intention of creating a national perspective.81 The 
Strategic Direction’s four main priorities for the FLP are to (i) promote 
strategic conservation of private forests, (ii) conserve private forests 
that provide environmental and economic benefits to people and 
communities, (iii) slow the conversion and parcelization of 
environmentally and economically important private forests, and (iv) 
continually improve FLP business practices.82 These goals sound 
broad, but the Strategic Direction adds specificity. For example, in 
promoting the strategic conservation of forests, FLP looks for projects 
that contribute to “regional, landscape, or watershed-based efforts to 
protect important private forests, regardless of tract size.”83 Strategic 
conservation within the FLP’s framework also means focusing on local 
conservation priorities, as determined by the state assessment plans, 
 
77 Forest Legacy Program, supra note 75. 
78 National S&PF Authorities and Guidance 8 (May 11, 2011), http://www.fs.fed.us/spf 
/redesign/spf%20authorities.pdf [hereinafter Redesign Authorities]. 
79 Id. 
80 USDA FOREST SERV. STATE & PRIVATE FORESTRY COOP., FORESTRY FINAL 
AMENDED FOREST LEGACY PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES 8 (June 30, 2003 
amended Dec. 21, 2011); see also Guide to the Forest Legacy Program, THE LAND TRUST 
ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/policy/public-funding/forest-legacy-guide 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2016). 
81 FLP Strategic Direction, supra note 61, at 1. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 5. 
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and attempting to “strategically link to other protected lands to create a 
cumulative conservation effect.”84 
Meeting the “benefits to people and communities” standard under 
the second goal of the Strategic Direction requires satisfaction of one 
of the following three sub-goals: protecting waters; providing 
economic activities; and conserving fish, wildlife, plans, and unique 
forest communities.85 Additionally, it is a USFS priority to protect state 
and private lands that are adjacent to or within national forests because 
they often interact as a single ecosystem.86 Poor forest health of private 
inholdings or adjacent lands could potentially damage the health of 
national forests by subjecting them to insect problems or wildfire.87 
The Strategic Direction’s “Guiding Principles” are as follows: 
striving for permanent protection of important forestlands, 
commitment to constant improvement, use of state assessment plans as 
a foundational source of local input, use of partnerships to purchase 
CEs or fee-simple forest properties, and encouragement of professional 
forest management and traditional forest uses that can coexist with the 
conservation purposes of a CE.88 While the Strategic Direction 
encourages traditional forest uses where the users create multiple use 
management plans and use best management practices, “priority is 
given to lands which can be effectively protected and managed and that 
have important scenic or recreational values; riparian areas; fish and 
wildlife values, including threatened and endangered species; or other 
ecological values.”89 
Though its guiding principles are somewhat broad, the FLP’s 
selection and acquisition of CEs is carefully planned. The FLP uses a 
competitive ranking process involving state and federal committees to 
select CEs that best meet the program’s goals.90 Consequently, rather 
than funding and implementing the majority of CEs offered, the FLP 
 
84 Id. at 6. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 See Robert L. Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions Linked to Global 
Climate Change: An Adaptive Approach to Federal Land Management, 87 NEB. L. REV. 
833, 879 (2009) (noting that problems faced by ecosystems will not “respect the political 
boundaries separating private from state or federal land”). 
88 FLP Strategic Direction, supra note 61, at 4. 
89 Id. 
90 See Forest Legacy Program Users’ Guide, USDA FOREST SERV. (June 2006), 
http://www.fs.fed.us/cooperativeforestry/library/flp_usersguide.pdf. 
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funds only the CEs that are best suited to meet the program’s goals in 
the long run. The FLP is also deliberate and specific with respect to the 
resources it intends to protect. It identifies resources that are of national 
importance, like water resources, but also recognizes the importance of 
local input to identify resources of local importance, like lands 
connecting or expanding vital natural tracts or ecosystems. 
Originally, the USFS negotiated the purchase of easements and fee-
simple properties directly.91 In 1996, Congress amended federal law to 
allow the USFS to make grants to states to allow the states to undertake 
the acquisitions themselves.92 Currently, FLP funds are allocated via 
cost sharing with states for project or administrative grants.93 Under 
this system, grant applicants must provide at least twenty-five percent 
of the project cost, an amount that may not derive from other federal 
funding.94 Often the cost share is made in the form of a donation by the 
landowner. 
All projects that receive FLP funds are required to report their 
accomplishments in the Forest Legacy Information System to measure 
performance over time.95 The FLP purports to be a great success, 
having conserved over 2.3 million acres of private forestland, and is 
experiencing “solid growth in terms of budget.”96 According to the 
USFS: “The program has been successful due to the clear national need 
for a conservation program that focuses on forests and to the hard work 
of state, local, and nonprofit partners to produce effective results.”97 
B. NRCS & CEs 
NRCS’s broad mission is to provide farmers and ranchers with 
financial and technical assistance to promote conservation and 
sustainable agricultural activities.98 Like the direct production benefits 
used to promote forest regeneration projects by private forestland 
owners, farm owners can apply for direct production benefits based on 
 
91 Id. 
92 Forest Legacy Program, supra note 75; THE LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.land 
trustalliance.org/policy/public-funding/forest-legacy-guide (last visited Nov. 21, 2016). 
93 See FLP Strategic Direction, supra note 61. 
94 Forest Legacy Program, THE LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance 
.org/policy/public-funding/forest-legacy-guide (last visited Nov. 21, 2016). 
95 FLP Strategic Direction, supra note 61, at 8. 
96 FLP Strategic Direction, supra note 61, at 4; Forest Legacy Program, supra note 75. 
97 FLP Strategic Direction, supra note 61, at 4. 
98 About NRCS, USDA NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., http://www.nrcs.usda.gov 
/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/about/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2016). 
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the crops they produce.99 However, like the § 170(h) deduction, 
agricultural subsidies have become infamous for abuse.100 Agricultural 
subsidies are criticized for harming the environment, disturbing the free 
market, and presenting high costs to the government.101 While it could 
be argued that, like agricultural subsidies, CEs are disturbing the free 
market,102 NRCS’s use of CEs can be seen as a less controversial way 
to allocate federal resources, and if done properly, with less potential 
for abuse. 
1. Agricultural Conservation Easement Program 
The most recent Farm Bill, the Agriculture Act of 2014, went into 
effect on February 27, 2015.103 This Act consolidated the Wetlands 
Reserve Program, the Farm and Ranch Lands Protection Program, and 
the Grassland Reserve Program into the Agricultural Conservation 
Easement Program (ACEP).104 ACEP facilitates the acquisition of two 
types of CEs: agricultural land easements and wetland reserve 
easements.105 Under the agricultural land easements component of 
ACEP, NRCS provides matching funds to state and local government, 
tribes, and qualified conservation organizations to help them purchase 
easements protecting agricultural lands in perpetuity.106 In contrast, 
under the wetland reserve easements component, NRCS purchases 
easements directly from landowners to protect the wetlands and 
associated lands either in perpetuity or for thirty years.107 
 
99 Marcelo Ostrea: How U.S. Agricultural Subsidies Harm the Environment, Taxpayers, 
and the Poor, NAT’L CTR. FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.ncpa.org/pub 
/ib126. 
100 Tim Worstall, The Real Problem with Farm Subsidies: They Don’t Subsidize Farms, 
FORBES MAG. (2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/03/20/the-real-prob 
lem-with-farm-subsidies-they-dont-subsidise-farms/. 
101 Ostrea, supra note 99. 
102 See John M. Vandilck, Waiting for Uncle Sam to Buy the Farm . . . Forest or Wetland, 
8 FORDHAM ENVTL L.J. 691 (2006). 
103 Id. 
104 2014 Farm Bill, USDA NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., http://www.nrcs.usda.gov 
/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/programs/farmbill/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2016). 
105 AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION EASEMENT PROGRAM  RULE, 7 C.F.R § 1468 
(2015) [hereinafter ACEP FINAL RULE]; U.S. S. COMM. ON AGRICULTURE NUTRITION AND 
FORESTRY, 113TH S., 2014 FARM BILL TITLE BY TITLE SUMMARY, http://www.agri 
culture.senate.gov/download/?id=A04E89D3-90B5-4BC6-90EA-AB34D1851E05. 
106 ACEP FINAL RULE, supra note 105. 
107 Id. 
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Unlike the conservation purposes tests under § 170 (h), the eligibility 
requirements for ACEP CEs are extensive and specific. Program-wide, 
the following lands are ineligible: federal lands except those held in 
trust for Indian Tribes, state-owned lands, land subject to an existing 
easement, and lands that have onsite or offsite conditions that would 
undermine the purpose of the program. ACEP further limits eligibility 
within each of its two components. Another limiting factor is that 
available funding is based on the resource in question. Wetland and 
grassland easements, for example, are eligible for more funding from 
NRCS and require less from state or local organizations.108 For 
agricultural land easements, ACEP requires local cooperative 
agreements which lay out the procedures for purchasing the CEs, the 
specific requirements for every easement, and the terms that must be 
included in the easements (“minimum deed terms”).109 The minimum 
deed terms help to ensure consistency in the funding, drafting, 
administration, enforcement, and interpretation of the CEs, including 
monitoring and reporting requirements, which are useful in 
enforcement, though not addressed in this Article.110 
Moreover, after eligibility is established, ACEP prioritizes projects 
by creating a ranking system for funding, in which parcels compete for 
assistance during a given funding period.111 In addition to the national 
ranking criteria, states may set ranking criteria and scoring systems, but 
the national ranking criteria must comprise at least half of the parcel’s 
score.112 The national ranking criteria are quantitative and include 
factors such as percentage of prime, unique soil; grazing uses and 
related conservation values to be protected; percent of cropland, 
pastureland, grassland, or rangeland in the overall parcel; ratio of the 
farm’s overall size to the average size in the particular area; population 
growth in the area; proximity to other protected land; whether adjacent 
land is currently enrolled in a CE program or was previously enrolled 
in the past programs; and “other similar criteria.”113 Enrollment in past 
 
108 Id. 
109 Id. (Parties or entities under the Cooperative Agreements may be “Indian Tribe, state 
government, local government, or a nongovernmental organization that has an agricultural 
land easement program . . . .”). 
110 See Agricultural Conservation Easement Program Agricultural Land Easement 
Minimum Deed Terms for the Protection of Agricultural Use, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/easements/acep/. 
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programs is important to consider because, for example, conservation 
reserve program contracts (which only temporarily protect the 
conservation values of land) eventually expire, and the subject land 
could benefit from protection under a long-term or perpetual 
easement.114 
On a state level, state conservation and technical committees may 
consider, “the location of a parcel in an area zoned for agricultural use, 
the eligible entity’s performance in managing and enforcing easements, 
multifunctional benefits of agricultural land protection, geographic 
regions where enrollment of particular lands may help achieve program 
objectives, and diversity of natural resources to be protected.”115 
Because they will vary by locality, the state criteria outlined in the 
national rule document are more general.116 The ranking system can 
also assign negative points for organizations that are delinquent on 
annual monitoring reports for CEs.117 States may also establish 
minimum thresholds for points in the ranking system below which 
projects will not be funded.118 
Thus, like the FLP, ACEP does not accept every CE that is offered 
and instead uses careful front-end scrutiny to determine which CEs are 
best suited for conservation and most deserving of federal funding. This 
selection process, which is absent in § 170(h), helps to ensure that 
ACEP CEs will provide a significant public benefit in exchange for the 
tax dollars spent. 
IV 
RESOURCE-SPECIFIC LAND TRUSTS 
Land trusts with resource-specific missions more closely mirror the 
federal programs discussed above. Nonprofit conservation 
organizations, most commonly state or local land trusts, acquire and 
hold CEs both through and outside of the above federal programs.119 







119 See infra Section V. 
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were categorized as national land trusts.120 The vast majority of land 
trusts appear to be location-, rather than resource-specific, meaning 
their mission is local conservation generally.121 While these “general 
conservation” land trusts appear to be the most common, some local 
and national nonprofits accept and hold CEs only in accordance with 
their more resource-specific missions. 
The Nature Conservancy is likely the most well-known land trust 
that strictly prioritizes the CEs it accepts. It explains: 
 The Conservancy today only will accept donations of 
conservation easements or purchase an easement on lands where 
significant conservation benefits are obtained. (In recent years, these 
increasingly are areas that have been identified as “portfolio sites” 
through ecoregional planning, a scientific process conducted by 
Conservancy scientists and outside experts.) The Conservancy has 
often turned down offers of donations of conservation easements on 
lands that do not fulfill the Conservancy’s mission, even though the 
lands may have important ecological values.122 
Some land trusts narrow their missions even further with respect to 
specific resources. For example, Ducks Unlimited and its affiliate 
Wetlands America Trust implement and hold conservation easements 
to “ensure that large acreages of wetlands, riparian habitats and 
important uplands will be preserved for the benefit of waterfowl, other 
wildlife and the enjoyment of future generations.”123 Ducks Unlimited 
does not accept all CEs; rather, it concentrates its conservation efforts 
on areas of particular importance to waterfowl.124 
 
120 2010 National Land Trust Census, THE LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, https://www.land 
trustalliance.org/land-trusts/land-trust-census. 
121 Find a Land Trust, THE LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance.org 
/find-land-trust; see, e.g., Mission Statement, THE MONTANA LAND RELIANCE, http://mt 
landreliance.org/about-us/mission-statement/ (“The mission of The Montana Land Reliance 
is to partner with landowners to provide permanent protection for private lands that are 
significant for agricultural production, forest resources, fish and wildlife habitat, and open 
space.”). 
122 Conservation Easements, Landowners With Whom The Conservancy Negotiates 
Easements, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, http://www.nature.org/about-us/private-lands       
-conservation/conservation-easements/all-about-conservation-easements.xml (explaining 
that the Nature Conservancy “uses a science-based planning process for each ecoregion 
across the world to assemble portfolios of conservation lands that collectively represent 
viable examples of all native species and plant communities within that ecoregion”). 
123 Duck’s Unlimited Conservation Easement Program, DUCKS UNLIMITED, http://www 
.ducks.org/conservation/land-protection/ducks-unlimited-conservation-easement-program. 
124 Conservation Easement FACs, DUCKS UNLIMITED, http://www.ducks.org/conser 
vation/land-protection/conservation-easement-FAQs. 
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The Humane Society of the United States’ Wildlife Land Trust limits 
its CEs to lands that can serve as permanent sanctuaries for wildlife.125 
In addition to screening potential properties for wildlife values, such as 
critical habitat or habitat linkages, all Wildlife Land Trust CEs prohibit 
recreational and commercial hunting or trapping, as well as 
development within protected areas.126 
Similarly, Alabama’s Freshwater Land Trust only holds CEs that are 
“critical for the protection of rivers and streams and that provide 
recreational opportunities for the community.”127 Further narrowing the 
scope of CEs that it protects, the Freshwater Land Trust set specific 
conservation priorities and identified a seven-county area in which it 
aims to have one property per county that ranks high in each of its 
priorities.128 
Another example, Vital Ground, is a land trust whose mission is “to 
protect and restore North America’s grizzly bear populations by 
conserving wildlife habitat.”129 Like the federal programs, Vital 
Ground is “both selective and strategic” in its conservation strategies 
to connect fragmented lands that serve as important grizzly habitat.130 
These resource-specific land trusts scrutinize potential CEs by 
looking at the land in question for specific resource values, rather than 
any conservation value that might meet § 170(h)’s broad conservation 
purposes tests. They also tailor the terms of their CEs to carry out their 
specific purposes and provide maximum protection of the targeted 
conservation values. Additionally, these land trusts gradually develop 
a special institutional knowledge concerning areas that will both meet 
§ 170(h)’s conservation purposes test and be in accordance with their 
particularized missions. 
 
125 Qualifying Criteria, THE HUMANE SOCIETY WILDLIFE LAND TRUST, http://www 
.wildlifelandtrust.org/how-you-can-help/protect-your-land/qualifyingcriteria.html 
[hereinafter HUMANE SOCIETY]. 
126 Conservation Options for Landowners, THE HUMANE SOCIETY WILDLIFE LAND 
TRUST, http://www.wildlifelandtrust.org/how-you-can-help/protect-your-land/conservation 
-options-for.html. 
127 Who We Are, FRESHWATER LAND TRUST, http://www.freshwaterlandtrust.org/who    
-we-are [hereinafter FRESHWATER LAND TRUST]. 
128 Common Questions, FRESHWATER LAND TRUST, http://www.freshwaterlandtrust 
.org/who-we-are/common-questions/. 
129 Our Vision, VITAL GROUND, http://www.vitalground.org/about/about-us/foundation 
-info/ [hereinafter VITAL GROUND]. 
130 Id. 
OSSWALD (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2017  3:30 PM 
24 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 32, 1 
V 
COMMON TOOLS USED BY RESOURCE-SPECIFIC PROGRAMS 
Resource-specific CE implementation could begin to address two 
common forms of abuse of the § 170(h) deduction: valuation and 
conservation purposes abuses. The resource-specific USDA and land 
trust CE acquisition programs analyzed above overlap in their common 
use of front-end procedural mechanisms to acquire CEs, much like 
those of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The use of 
these mechanisms is important because it does two major things that 
can minimize or reduce valuation abuse and failures in meeting the 
conservation purposes test of § 170(h). First, these controls promote 
greater front-end consideration of each CE. Second, the controls use 
and build specific institutional knowledge within the CE 
implementation organizations that can be applied to each CE. The 
following section discusses how the above programs promote these two 
values and, in turn, increase the likelihood of CEs that ensure 
conservation without the abuses discussed in this Article. 
A. Front-End Procedural Tools 
Like the idea of resource specification in environmental laws, the 
importance of mandatory forethought in regulatory schemes is not a 
new concept either. NEPA, for example, requires governments to 
evaluate the potential adverse environmental consequences of their 
actions before allocating federal funding.131 The Land Trust Alliance, 
the national umbrella organization for the nation’s land trusts, has also 
addressed forethought specifically with respect to CEs. The Land Trust 
Alliance promotes “Strategic Conservation . . . a process that produces 
tools to aid decision makers in identifying, prioritizing, pursuing, and 
protecting those specific tracts of land that will most effectively and 
efficiently achieve the land trust’s mission.”132 For example, strategic 
plans for organizations that focus on freshwater resources help those 
land trusts to focus on the protection of critical stream corridors, 
watersheds, and water supplies.133 Strategic plans may also call for the 
mapping of areas to delineate places with low or high conservation 
 
131 Mark A. Chertok, Overview of the National Environmental Policy Act: 
Environmental Impact Assessments and Alternatives, SR045 ALI-ABA 757, 775 (2005). 
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values.134 Front-end strategizing has also been coined as “green 
infrastructure,” explained by the Conservation Fund as: “solutions that 
government leaders, conservationists, and others need to create 
systemic and lasting change—in major cities, watersheds, and even 
multi-state regions. Strategic conservation makes economic sense—
establishing an environmental legacy for future generations in the most 
efficient and cost effective manner.”135 
Like NEPA and the Land Trust Alliance’s recommendations above, 
resource-specific CE programs promote more intensive front-end 
planning to strategize resource use. Under NEPA, agencies that 
undertake a major federal action, must take a “hard look” at the 
potential consequences at the earliest practicable time.136 Broadly 
speaking, a “major federal action” includes significant allocations of 
federal funding or decisions made by federal agencies such as grants or 
denials of permits.137 In contrast, under § 170(h) major amounts of 
federal funding are allocated to CE acquisition without sufficient front-
end procedural hurdles. The success of the programs analyzed in this 
Article is partially due to promotion of NEPA-style front-end planning 
through (i) prioritization of resource distribution and (ii) stringent 
eligibility requirements. 
1. Resource-Type Prioritization 
Rather than accepting most or all CEs offered, the resource-specific 
programs analyzed above prioritize the types of resources they aim to 
protect. For example, a major focus of the redesign of both federal 
programs was careful allocation of limited federal funding.138 Both 
ACEP and FLP prioritize their CE funding based on a competitive 
ranking system.139 In this way, these systems are designed to ensure 
that the CEs they fund are best suited to accomplish the forestland, 
agricultural land, and wetland protection purposes of the programs.140 
In both programs, the amount of federal funding allocated depends not 
only on the reduction in the fair market value of the property in 
 
134 Id. 
135 Strategic Conservation Planning, THE CONSERVATION FUND, http://www.conserva 
tionfund.org/what-we-do/strategic-conservation-planning. 
136 Chertok, supra note 131, at 775. 
137 Id. 
138 Redesign, supra note 69. 
139 ACEP FINAL RULE, supra note 105; Redesign, supra note 69. 
140 ACEP FINAL RULE, supra note 105; Redesign, supra note 69. 
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question, as is the case with respect to § 170(h), but may also depend 
on the resource being protected. 
The land trusts with resource-specific missions discussed above also 
smartly prioritize their CE acquisitions to meet their resource-specific 
conservation goals. For example, the Alabama Freshwater Land Trust 
prioritizes its CE acquisitions based on freshwater resources and on 
location, which allows the organization to meet its freshwater resource-
specific goals in particular counties.141 Vital Ground is in some ways 
even more specific, looking at the habitats of individual bears to select 
geographically appropriate CEs.142 The Humane Society Wildlife Land 
Trust prioritizes based on specific habitat values of land, rather than 
tract size.143 
2. Hard-Line Eligibility Requirements 
In addition to the priorities outlined above, the resource-specific 
programs have firm eligibility requirements that further limit 
participation. Unlike § 170(h), which requires meeting only one of four 
broadly defined conservation purposes tests and working with an 
obliging conservation organization, all of the organizations discussed 
by this article outline specific eligibility requirements beyond those set 
forth in § 170(h) for CE acquisitions. When eligibility requirements 
value specific resources, organizations and agencies must 
automatically conduct a NEPA-like “hard look” conceptual process in 
that they must consider certain resource values of the land in question 
before acquiring or funding a CE. 
In addition to the Farm Bill’s general restrictions on the USDA, both 
the NRCS and USFS’s eligibility requirements to participate in CE 
programs are based on resources. If states wish to participate in the 
FLP, they must submit an Assessment of Need showing that the 
resources are both important and threatened.144 If an entity wishes to 
participate in ACEP or the FLP, it must provide a cash match to the 
government’s contribution.145 Not only does cash matching restrict the 
sheer number of eligible entities, it shows local investment in the 
project. This automatically decreases the likelihood of hostility towards 
 
141 FRESHWATER LAND TRUST, supra note 127. 
142 VITAL GROUND, supra note 129. 
143 HUMANE SOCIETY, supra note 125. 
144 Redesign, supra note 69. 
145 ACEP FINAL RULE, supra note 105. 
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federal control from local parties and increases the chances of success 
through local help with the process. 
Finally, unlike ACEP and FLP, § 170(h) is not subject to cut backs 
in federal funding, despite that it costs federal taxpayers an estimated 
$1.5 billion per year.146 ACEP and FLP hardline eligibility 
requirements also effectively weed out potentially problematic CEs 
before requiring analysis by the agencies of individual properties, and 
before imposing high costs on the federal government. Thus, eligibility 
requirements act as an effective procedural hurdle without requiring 
excessive work on the part of the agencies. 
B. Institutional Knowledge 
In addition to prompting front-end planning, the other important 
component of resource specification is that it ensures each organization 
acquiring CEs will have increased institutional knowledge with respect 
to its resource of choice. Greater institutional knowledge increases 
resilience, or the capacity to adapt over time, important in this case 
because, hopefully, CEs preserve land in perpetuity.147 Resilient 
organizations are better suited to select and draft CEs that will better 
withstand litigation and are more likely to accomplish successful long-
term conservation. For obvious reasons, the USFS and NRCS almost 
certainly have a greater knowledge of what constitutes successful forest 
or farmland conservation than a small, local land trust. However, the 
entire CE system does not need to be in federal hands to ensure more 
extensive institutional knowledge. The USDA programs and the 
resource-specific land trust programs discussed above have similar 
qualities that promote institutional knowledge. In addition to 
specifying resources, which will increase interaction with and 
knowledge of the resources, the programs are intentional in their 
incorporation of local knowledge, which ensures not only increased 
success with respect to a resource generally, but increases the 
likelihood of success with respect to specific projects, as shown below. 
 
146 Roger Colinvaux, Conservation Easements: Design Flaws, Enforcement Challenges, 
and Reform, 33 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 69, 70 (2013). 
147 See generally Fitrek Burkes & Nancy Turner, Knowledge, Learning, and the 
Evolution of Conservation Practice for Social-Ecological System Resilience, 34 HUM. 
ECOLOGY, no.4, at 279−94 (2006). 
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1. Localized Approaches 
This Article promotes some national uniformity, but recognizes that 
implementation of localized approaches is also important because such 
knowledge can help to address some of the national program’s issues. 
Local input within the resource-specific land trusts is almost second 
nature, but still important. Vital Ground, for example, approaches CEs 
on a case-by-case basis to look at specific bears’ habitats and must 
inherently work with local partners to gain the knowledge to properly 
address that habitat.148 However, even within the federal programs, in 
addition to resource-specific CE implementation, the programs 
gravitate towards or incorporate local input. In the Cooperative 
Forestry redesign, the USFS requires states to complete and submit 
statewide assessment strategies of forest resources. Additionally, if 
states wish to participate in the FLP, they must submit an Assessment 
of Need.149 In ACEP, cooperative agreements with local agencies are 
required for all CEs. Both FLP and ACEP’s ranking programs require 
that projects are ranked first at a state level, so that projects of great 
local importance are funded, or funded first. Thus, even the large 
federal programs are careful to utilize specific local knowledge. Use of 
state ranking systems as a foundational source of local input also 
provides strength to these programs by ensuring that they are developed 




Loss of private or local programs altogether would be a major loss 
for conservation in general. While it would not be advantageous to limit 
projects to the point that valid conservation opportunities decrease, the 
astronomical cost of the current § 170(h) deduction and reports of abuse 
suggest that federal funds might be better spent implementing the 
ACEP and FLP programs (which are currently having their funding 
reduced), rather than continuing the cycle of issue-ridden tax 
deductions. However, as successful federal CE programs seem to 
indicate, the use of federal expertise when allocating federal funding 
may ensure more successful conservation in the long run, while 
programs with little or no uniform federal oversight are problematic. 
For this reason, in addition to promoting NEPA-style front-end 
 
148 VITAL GROUND, supra note 129. 
149 Redesign, supra note 69. 
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planning and incorporating the above thematic similarities into private 
and local programs, this Article recommends resource-specific federal 
oversight from the relevant federal resource agencies. Although these 
suggestions would require more front-end planning, and therefore more 
work, the increasing amount of litigation with respect to deductions 
claimed for CE donations seems to indicate that they would be 
worthwhile. Further, the possibility of stemming the revenue losses that 
result from the large deductions being claimed and granted makes the 
suggestions in this Article more compelling. 
Thus, to be eligible for a federal deduction for the donation of a CE, 
both the grantor and grantee should be required to fulfill something 
equivalent to the NEPA “hard look” standard. This Article suggests two 
potential front-end resource-specific mechanisms to promote federal 
oversight and uniformity: (A) minimum deed terms and (B) federal 
resource agency approval. 
A. Minimum Deed Terms 
All taxpayers should be required to use minimum deed terms in their 
§ 170(h) deductible CEs, as is required by the federal purchase 
programs and many state conservation easement purchase programs. 
First, minimum deed terms would help to create uniformity and avoid 
potential CE drafting problems or loopholes. Second, minimum deed 
terms could force CE implementation to be resource specific. For 
example, the ACEP minimum deed terms impose different restrictions 
for agricultural viability versus grasslands or grazing uses.150 The 
minimum deed terms require that different types of easements impose 
different terms for roads, permeable surfaces, and significant features, 
to name a few, depending on what is necessary to protect the resource 
in question.151 In addition, the minimum deed terms ensure that terms 
that should not vary from easement to easement (such as the terms 
relating to possible extinguishment of the easement and reimbursement 
of the federal government for its investment in such event) are uniform 
across the nation. 
 
150 See Agricultural Conservation Easement Program Agricultural Land Easement 
Minimum Deed Terms for the Protection of Agricultural Use, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. NATURAL 
RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV., AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION EASEMENT 
PROGRAM AGRICULTURAL USE (2015), http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main 
/national/programs/easements/acep/ (scroll right sidebar and follow “FY 2015 ACEP- ALE 
Minimum Deed Terms” and select download as pdf) (last visited Oct. 21, 2016). 
151 Id. 
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B. Federal Resource Agency Approval 
Tax reform should also require that CEs donated to nonprofit land 
trusts or state or local government entities receive approval from the 
appropriate federal resource management agency to be eligible for the 
§ 170(h) deduction. Thus, a landowner who wants to claim a deduction 
for the donation of a CE protecting farmland as open space would seek 
approval from NRCS, while a CE protecting wildlife would need to be 
approved by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), and so on. 
Because federal resource agencies like NRCS, USFS, and USFWS 
employ experts specializing in agricultural lands, forestlands, and 
wildlife, respectively, they are well-suited to evaluate eligibility for CE 
deductions. Additionally, these agencies already use their expertise to 
protect CEs under the ACEP and the FLP, or through USFWS’ existing 
conservation programs.152 
Thus, NRCS, USFS, and USFWS are qualified to evaluate 
conservation purposes, and, because they typically fund easement 
acquisitions, they also are qualified to evaluate the economic value of 
new easements. While this oversight would require more agency staff 
time, any increased cost to the agency would likely be less than the 
current cost of the federal tax program. This oversight would 
incorporate the above similarities of successful programs outlined by 
this article by continuing to benefit from the local knowledge of the 
state and local land trusts and government entities, while enhancing 
front-end planning through use of the institutional knowledge and 
resource-specific expertise of the relevant federal agency. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, it is necessary to reconcile the scope of resources protected 
locally using CEs with the nationwide application of § 170(h). While 
CE reform must account for the fact that CEs protect a wide variety of 
natural and historic resources, national tax benefits are an important 
contributor to the conservation successes of CEs. Conservation 
programs that are thoughtful and intentional in their resource allocation 
should not suffer while blanket provisions like § 170(h) are being 
abused to the tune of millions of dollars. 
 
152 USFWS implements (or partners with other agencies and organizations to implement) 
wildlife conservation programs, based on a particular species of need—i.e., endangered 
species, or species that depend on particular habitats. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
Partnerships in Conservation, http://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-we-do/fws-programs 
.html (2013). 
OSSWALD (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2017  3:30 PM 
2016] Custom-Made Conservation: Resource-Specific 31 
Conservation Easement Implementation Unpaves 
the Path of Tax Abuse 
Resource specification is an important part of the path towards the 
resolution of these issues. It uses an existing framework created though 
decades of building on the common law by environmental and natural 
resources laws, and it is already used by federal resource protection 
programs. Resource specification creates more deliberate CE use by 
encouraging front-end planning and building institutional knowledge, 
which increases the likelihood that CEs will conserve more efficiently 
and with less potential for tax abuse. 
Thus, CE reform is necessary to curb abuse of the important 
incentive offered by § 170(h). If it is addressed by the current proposed 
changes to the tax code, we will continue to look at CEs solely in 
monetary terms. In considering possible local and national reforms, it 
is necessary to recognize that CEs protect diverse natural resources. For 
the foregoing reasons, reform measures should focus on resource 
specification through uniform federal oversight, not the currently 
proposed restrictive tax code reforms that do not fully address the 
substance of the issue. 
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